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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Arab-Israeli conflict over the status of Palestine has cap-
tured international attention for most of this century. This attention 
waned somewhat in the middle of this decade with increased inter-
national focus upon the Iran-Iraq War.l However, the Palestinian 
question has once again assumed great international importance 
because of the current Palestinian uprising against both the twenty-
year Israeli occupation of the West Bank and GazaStrip and the 
security practices Israel has employed to quell this most recent 
unrest. 2 These practices include deportations, curfews, house ar-
rests, demolition of homes,3 Israeli settlement of the occupied ter-
I See Pressburg, The Uprising: Causes and Consequences, 17 J. PALESTINE STUD. 38, 42 
(Spring 1988). 
2 See id. The Palestinians essentially felt that international focus, especially by Arab states, 
on other issues such as the Iran-Iraq War had rendered international conferences meaning-
less and necessitated the uprising (intifadah) to raise the Palestinian question to world view 
once again. 
3 Reicin, Preventive Detention, Curfews, Demolition of Houses and Deportations: An Analysis of 
Measures Employed by Israel in the Administered Territories, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 515, 516 (1987). 
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ritories,4 and the most recent policy of "force, might and beatings."5 
Palestinians have claimed that these policies violate their civil and 
human rights and studies by many international human rights 
groups confirm their view.6 
This Note will first discuss, on an historical and a legal basis, 
whether the Palestinians are a "people" who have the right to self-
determination. The Note will then analyze under international law 
the Israeli rule of law in the occupied territories and the "security" 
practices Israel employs in these territories. While some of these 
practices comply with international law, others do not. 
II. THE PALESTINIANS AS A PEOPLE ENTITLED TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 
The discussion of the history of the Palestinian conflict contin-
ually raises the issue of the Palestinian right to self-determination. 
The concept of self-determination has evolved throughout history.7 
It is defined as the right of a "people," defined by its common 
history, traditions, language and ethnic background,s to constitute 
an independent state and determine its own government. 9 The 
Greeks and the Romans were among the first peoples to demand 
self-determination, though both frequently denied it to other 
groups whom they conquered. 1O John Locke wrote that political 
societies cannot exist unless they have the consent of the people 
included within them. 11 Thomas Jefferson advocated the right of 
all peoples to defend their liberty against outside, belligerent 
states. 12 It was not until after World War I, however, when Woodrow 
Wilson asserted that all peoples and nations have the right to self-
determination, that the concept received worldwide attention. 13 
'See generally Comment, Palestinian Self-Determination and Israeli Settlements on the West 
Bank: An Analysis of Their Legality Under International Law, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 
551,581-91 (1986) [hereinafter, Comment, Israeli Settlements]. 
5 See Shehadeh, Occupier's Law and the Uprising, 17 J. PALESTINE STUD. 24, 29 (Spring 
1988). 
6 See generally Punamaki, Experiences of Torture, Means of Coping, and Levels of Symptoms 
among Palestinian Prisoners, 17 J. PALESTINE STUD. 81 (Summer 1988). 
7 See generally U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972). 
8 Comment, Israeli Settlements, supra note 4, at 560. 
9 A. COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 39 (1970). 
10 See U. UMOZURIKE, supra note 7, at 4-5. 
II Id. at 6. 
12 Id. at 8-9. 
13 A. COBBAN, supra note 9, at 62-64. 
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Wilson insisted that any resolution of pre-World War I colonial 
claims must consider the indigenous populations. 14 The League of 
Nations essentially followed the Wilson plan when it established the 
Mandate system to administer former colonies. 15 Under the Man-
date system, a foreign power, assigned by the League, would oversee 
a former colony until that territory was able to assert its own rights 
and maintain its political independence. 16 
The United Nations Charter, though not specifically mention-
ing the concept of self-determination as a legal right, provided for 
"friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."17 The United 
Nations has since issued many declarations and resolutions which 
have emphasized the importance of self-determination. 18 
Both the Palestinians and the Jews have frequently asserted 
their right to self-determination within Palestine. 19 According to 
14 See U. UMOZURIKE, supra note 7, at 14. 
15 Id. at 29-30. 
16 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22. Article 22 states that the people in former 
colonial areas who are "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions 
of the modern world ... " should be given tutelage by "advanced nations who by reason of 
their resources, their experience, or their geographical position can best undertake this 
responsibility .... The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of 
development of the people, the geographical situation of the people, its economic conditions 
and other similar circumstances." Article 22 further declared that some areas, primarily those 
formerly under Turkish control, had developed to a point where their existence as indepen-
dent nations could be recognized subject to administrative assistance by the power entrusted 
with the Mandate until they could stand alone as nations. 
17 U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 2. 
18 See Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 
1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). This declaration 
proclaimed that "[aJII peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development." See also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200B, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6546 
(1966) (both resolutions stated that "all peoples have the right of self-determination."); 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). This declaration provided that "[eJvery State has 
the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples .... " Id. at 123-24. 
19 See generally F. KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA (2d. ed. 1976). For the purposes 
of this Note the area identified as Palestine includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. Others have argued that at various points throughout history the area of Palestine 
included what is now the State of Jordan. This Note limits the definition of Palestine to the 
areas listed above based upon the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. MANDATE FOR 
PALESTINE League of Nations Doc. C.529 M.314 1922 VI (C.P.M. 466). 
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one Palestinian scholar, the Palestinian right of self-determination 
is based on the fact that they are a people with a common language, 
a common historical experience, and a common attachment to that 
particular geographical area. 20 The people now known as the Pal-
estinians inhabited Palestine as the overwhelming majority from the 
sixth century A.D. up to the end of World War J.2! They have 
endured many foreign occupations, including those of the Seljuk 
Turks, the European Crusaders, the Tartars, the Ottoman Turks,22 
and now the Israelis. 23 
In ancient times Abraham led the Jews to Palestine, though 
they soon moved on to inhabit Egypt.24 The Jews returned to Pal-
estine in the twelfth century B.C. and remained as the majority 
group there for slightly less than two hundred years. 25 Jewish rule 
ended when first the Assyrians, then the Babylonians, the Persians, 
the Greeks and the Romans consecutively conquered the area and 
during the Roman occupation the vast majority of the Jewish in-
habitants were driven out of Palestine.26 
Modern Jewish claims to a national home in Palestine began in 
1897 at the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, at which 
Theodor Herzl founded the World Zionist Organization (WZO).27 
The WZO encouraged Jewish immigration to Palestine, and by the 
beginning of World War I 85,000 Jews had immigrated to Pales-
tine. 28 The WZO also lobbied the government of Great Britain to 
gain support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. In 1917 Britain 
adopted, at the insistence of Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, the 
now famous Balfour Declaration as national policy.29 The Balfour 
Declaration designated Palestine as a future national home for the 
Jewish people and provided that the rights of the non-Jewish in-
habitants of Palestine were not to be violated in pursuit of this 
goa1. 30 
20 Talhami, The Palestinian Perception of the Human Rights Issue, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. 
& COM. 475, 475 (1987). 
21 See F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 2. 
22Id. 
23 Shehadeh, supra note 5, at 24. 
24 See F. KHOURI supra note 19, at I. 
25Id. 
26Id. at 1-2. 
27 C. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 30 (1988). 
2H /d. at 32. 
2" Balfour Declaration, Letter from Lord Arthur J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild (Nov. 2, 
1917), reprinted in C. SMITH, supra note 27, at 55; see also id. at 53-55. 
30 Balfour Declaration, supra note 29. 
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Modern recognition of the Palestinians as a people inhabiting 
the area of Palestine began in the early part of this century when 
Great Britain formally sought Palestinian aid against the Ottoman 
Turks during World War I in exchange for a promise of Arab 
independence after the war.31 
After World War I, the League of Nations established a Man-
date for Palestine which recognized both the Jews and the Palestin-
ians as peoples entitled to Palestine.32 During the Mandate, the 
problems of two peoples vying for the same area of land became 
apparent. Jewish immigration increased substantially during this 
period and these immigrants used various means to confiscate Pal-
estinian-held land.33 The Palestinians lacked the unity, education, 
leadership or international influence to sufficiently defend them-
selves and they lost much of their property to the Jewish settlers.34 
The Palestinians eventually rose in rebellion several times during 
31 F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 6-10. In the 1915 discussions between Sir Henry Mc-
Mahon, the British High Commissioner of Egypt, and Sharif Hussein, the spokesman for 
Arab interests in the areas under Turkish control (including Palestine), the Sharif requested 
British recognition of Arab independence in an area bounded on the north by Turkey and 
extending eastward to Persia (Iran) and the Persian Gulf and westward to the Mediterranean 
and Red Seas. In exchange, the Arabs agreed to revolt against Turkish rule. McMahon 
agreed "to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying 
within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif" with some exceptions. Palestine was not among 
the exceptions. [d. at 7. 
Sir Reginald Wingate, the subsequently appointed British High Commissioner of Egypt, 
sent two messages to the Sharif in 1918 reiterating McMahon's previous pledges. [d. at 8. 
32 Mandate for Palestine, supra note 19. Palestine was established as a Mandate with Great 
Britain as the power entrusted with the Mandate. The Mandate provided for the establish-
ment of a Jewish national home, id. at art. 2, for the facilitation of Jewish immigration to 
and settlement in Palestine, id. at art. 6, for the means by which Jewish immigrants could 
acquire Palestinian citizenship, id. at art. 7, and for the recognition of the WZO as the 
representative of the Jewish people in Palestine. [d. at art. 4. 
The Mandate, however, was set up as an A-Mandate, which under Article 22 of the 
League Covenant meant that Palestine was an area already at a point where it could be 
recognized as an independent nation subject to the administrative assistance of the power 
entrusted with the Mandate. U. UMOZURIKE, supra note 7, at 34, 39. It also specifically 
provided for the protection of Palestine's indigenous inhabitants, Mandate for Palestine, at art. 
2, for the protection of local autonomy, id. at art. 3, for the freedom of conscience and 
worship, id. at art. 15, and prohibited discrimination based upon race, religion or language. 
[d. There was thus a recognition of the Palestinians and the Jews as "peoples" entitled to 
self-determination within Palestine. 
33 F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 18. Jews purchased much of this land from what the 
British considered state owned land and from absentee landowners in Syria and Lebanon 
separated from their land by the League-imposed mandate boundary. After each Jewish 
purchase, the Palestinian tenants and workers were evicted from the land and provisions 
were inserted into the deeds stating that the land could never be resold to Palestinians, nor 
could a Palestinian be employed on the land. 
34 [d. at 20. 
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the Mandate period to protest the perceived Zionist dominance of 
their home.35 In response, Great Britain, the power the League 
entrusted with the Mandate, sent several commissions to study the 
Palestine situation. Each one concluded that Britain should provide 
the indigenous Palestinian population with greater protection for 
their rights as a "people."36 In 1939 the British issued a "White 
Paper" which provided for 1) Palestinian independence in ten years 
if the Jews and the Palestinians were able to work out their differ-
ences in that period; 2) 75,000 more Jewish immigrants with further 
immigration contingent upon Palestinian approval; and 3) stringent 
restrictions on land sales to JewsY 
Great Britain, however, was unable to reconcile Palestinian and 
Zionist claims. During World War II Jews residing in Palestine 
generally backed Britain and the Allied war effort, believing that 
this would strengthen their cause.38 Many more Jews emigrated to 
Palestine to escape Nazi persecution in Europe. This gave even 
more impetus to the aspirations of Zionists for a Jewish state in 
35 C. SMITH, supra note 27, at 94-102; F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 21-25. 
36 C. SMITH, supra note 27, at 98; F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 22-23. The Shaw and 
Hope-Simpson Royal Commissions of 1929 and 1930, dispatched by Great Britain to study 
outbreaks of Palestinian violence, reported that 1) Palestinians feared that continued Jewish 
immigration and land purchases would make them a minority in their own country; 2) 
Palestinians resented Jewish immigrants who showed little or no concern for Palestinian 
interests; and 3) Palestinians were gravely concerned that the newly-settled Jews would 
eventually dominate them both economically and politically and that large-scale Palestinian 
unemployment would result. Id. 
In 1936 Britain sent the Peel Commission which reported that Palestinian unrest origi-
nated from a desire for their own national home and their hatred and fear of the proposed 
Jewish national home. It recommended partition as the only possible answer which would 
provide an opportunity for peace in the area. The Commission awarded the northern region 
of Palestine extending to just south of Nazareth with the coastal plain from Lebanon to below 
the city of Jaffa to a proposed Zionist state. The Palestinian state would include the remainder 
of the area including central Palestine (essentially the West Bank) and the entire region south 
of Jerusalem including the Gaza Strip, the Negev region (which extends south and west to 
the Sinai Peninsula and the Gulf of Aqaba), and the city of Jaffa. A thin strip extending 
from the coastal city of Jaffa to Jerusalem was to remain under a British mandate. C. SMITH, 
supra note 27, at 98. 
37 F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 26-27. The White Paper of 1939 was issued after the 
conclusion of a failed meeting in London of the British government, representatives of the 
Palestinian people (the Arab Higher Committee and other groups), representatives of various 
Arab nations, and the Jewish Agency in Palestine. Reactions to the White Paper varied. The 
Arab Higher Committee rejected it because it continued to allow Jewish immigration, though 
other Palestinian leaders saw that it made some concessions to their interests. The Jewish 
Agency also rejected it outright, claiming that it violated the terms of the Mandate for 
Palestine.ld. at 27. 
38 Id. at 27-28. 
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Palestine.39 As time passed, extremist Zionist groups which were 
angered by apparent British indecision regarding Palestine began 
to employ terrorist tactics against both the British and the Palestin-
ians.40 The Arab states responded to this growing Zionist threat and 
to British inaction regarding Palestine by forming the Arab League 
in 1945.41 One of the purposes of the Arab League was to apply, 
both jointly and separately, diplomatic pressure on Britain and 
other nations to consider Palestinian interests.42 Neither side was 
able to fully assert its cause until after 1947, when Britain decided 
it could not resolve the claims of both groups and requested the 
newly formed United Nations to assume responsibility for the Pal-
estinian problem.43 
In 1947, the United Nations recognized both Palestinian and 
Zionist interests in Palestine when it passed General Assembly Res-
olution 181, the Partition Resolution, which provided for two in-
dependent states in Palestine, a Zionist one and a Palestinian one.44 
Soon thereafter, in May 1948, the Zionist state declared its inde-
pendence as the state of Israel. 45 The Palestinians, however, were 
unorganized and unable to assert their rights as a people. Conse-
quently, they did not proclaim their own state.46 
The neighboring Arab nations then massed their armies out-
side the newly-declared state of Israel in order to, among other 
reasons, protect the Palestinian claims to their homeland.47 The 
ensuing battles between Israel and the Arab forces resulted in an 
39 See id. at 2S. 
4°F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 28; C. SMITH, supra note 27, at 120-21. The leading Zionist 
terrorist gangs were the Irgun (led by Menachem Begin) and the Stern Gang. The Irgun 
sought help from Fascist Italy and exploded jerusalem's principal hotel, the King David 
Hotel, in 1946, killing almost one hundred Palestinians, British and Jews. F. KHOURI, supra 
note 19, at 35. 
41 C. SMITH supra note 27, at 125; F. KHOURI supra note 19, at 31. 
42 [d. 
4" H. NUSEIBEH, PALESTINE AND THE UNITED NATIONS 23 (19SI). 
44 G.A. Res. lSI, 2 U.N. GAOR - Resolutions at 131 (1947) (the U.N. Partition Reso-
lution). This partition provided for two independent states, a Jewish state and a Palestinian 
state. The Palestinian state was to include what is now known as the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip areas plus the majority of Jerusalem, Western Galilee, the fertile plains of central 
Palestine, a strip around the Mediterrean port of Jaffa, and an area surrounding the Gaza 
Strip which extended north along the Mediterranean and south approximately half the 
distance to the Gulf of Aqaba. 
45 C. SMITH, supra note 27, at 145-46. 
46 See F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 6S. One of the reasons the Palestinians were unable 
to declare their own state was that the Arab League rejected the declaration of such a state 
in only these areas. [d. 
47 H. NUSEIBEH, supra note 43, at 26. 
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overwhelming Israeli victory.48 By the end of 1948 Israel had cap-
tured much of the area reserved for the Palestinian state.49 This 
caused over 470,000 Palestinians to flee their homes and settle in 
refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the only areas 
which Israel did not conquer.50 This is where the majority of the 
Palestinians remain today. 
The Palestinians, as vulnerable refugees, required outside Arab 
assistance to protect and provide for them. Jordan and Egypt re-
sponded by administering the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respec-
tively.51 The Palestinians, however, continued to remain a recogniz-
able people without a state in their own homeland. 
In 1964, the First Palestine National Council, a meeting of 
Palestinian leaders representing their respective communities, was 
held in Jerusalem. There, the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) emerged as the representative group of the Palestinian peo-
pie. 52 The PLO declared that its avowed purpose was to achieve 
"the liberation of Palestine" through "the elimination of Zionism in 
Palestine," the perceived obstacle to the Palestinian state.53 
The Palestinians, however, have been unable to realize this 
state. In 1967 the "Six Day War" erupted between Israel, on one 
side, and Jordan, Egypt and other neighboring Arab states on the 
other side. 54 Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza Strip during 
this war and has militarily occupied these areas to the present.55 
The United Nations has continued to recognize the Palestin-
ians' right to self-determination. 56 It has repeatedly recognized that 
the Palestinians are entitled to the inalienable right of self-deter-
mination and that full respect for this Palestinian inalienable right 
is an indispensable element of a just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East.c,7 It has established the Committee on the Inalienable Rights 




52 Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under 
International Law, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 18 (1980). 
53 Book Review, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689, 700 (1987) (reviewing W. T. MALLISON & 
S. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (1986)). 
54 See generally F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 257-60. 
55 Id. at 260. 
56 See Talhami, supra note 20, at 476. 
57 See G.A. Res. 2535B, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 25, U.N. Doc. A17630 (1969); 
G.A. Res. 2628, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 
2672,25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 3089D, 28 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 27, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 33/29, 33 U.N. GAOR 
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of the Palestinian People58 and a Special Unit of the Secretariat for 
Palestinian Rights.59 The United Nations General Assembly has 
further recognized the Palestinian people as "a principal party to 
the question of Palestine."60 The United Nations Security Council 
has also condemned the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land on 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, called for Israeli withdrawal from 
these areas, and for all parties involved to recognize every state in 
the region. 61 
Furthermore, the United Nations has affirmed the status of the 
PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian peo-
ple.62 It has additionally recognized that the PLO is a party to 
resolving the question of Palestine,63 and has invited the PLO to 
participate in United Nations meetings regarding Palestine.64 By 
the early 1980s over eighty nations had granted diplomatic recog-
nition to the PL065 and the PLO had representatives in virtually all 
of these nations.66 Finally, the United States, historically almost as 
fierce an opponent of the PLO and the Palestinian people as Israel, 
has recently declared that the PLO is a party to the question of 
Palestine and has agreed to meet with it in peace negotiations re-
garding the future of Palestine.67 
There is thus both an historical basis for, and an international 
recognition of, the Palestinians as a people. As a people the Pales-
tinians have the right to self-determination and the right to defend 
their liberty against any foreign occupier of their land.68 In addition, 
the Palestinians as a people are protected under international law 
from any foreign infringement upon their inalienable rights. 69 
Yet despite this Palestinian right to self-determination, Israel 
continues its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. To main-
Supp. (No. 45) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978); G.A. Res. 38/180D, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 47) at 51, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983). 
58 G.A. Res. 3376, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 3, U.N. Doc. AIl0034 (1975). 
59 G.A. Res. 32/40B, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977). 
60 G.A. Res. 3210, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); see also 
G.A. Res. 3236,29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
61 S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR - Resolutions and Decisions at 8 (1967). 
62 G.A. Res. 3375, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 3, U.N. Doc. AIl0034 (1975). 
63 G.A. Res. 3414, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 6, U.N. Doc. AIl0034 (1975). 
64 G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. 
Res. 3375, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/I0034 (1975); G.A. Res. 3210, 
29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
65 S. MISHAL, THE PLO UNDER ARAFAT: BETWEEN GUN AND OLIVE BRANCH 55 (1986). 
66Id. at 19. 
67 N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1988 at AI, col. 6, A18, col. 1. 
68 See U. UMOZURIKE, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
69 See supra note 57. 
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tain this occupation, Israel employs a variety of security measures. 
The next section discusses whether these measures comply with 
international law vis-it-vis the Palestinians' inalienable right to self-
determination. 
III. ISRAELI SECURITY MEASURES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 
STRIP UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Israel has occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 
1967.70 During this time it has employed many policies and practices 
in the occupied territories for "security reasons."7l These practices 
include preventive detentions, curfews, demolition of homes, de-
portations,72 settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israeli 
citizens,73 and the latest practice of "force, might and beatings."74 
The Palestinians, as well as many international groups that have 
examined the Palestinian situation, claim that these practices signif-
icantly violate the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.75 An 
analysis of these practices under international law indicates that this 
contention is correct. 
A. International Law of Military Occupation 
The 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of Wars on Land (Hague Convention)76 and the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)?7 provide many of the inter-
national legal standards for "security measures" taken by a state 
over areas it occupies militarily. Israel maintains that its practices in 
70 Cohen,Justice for Occupied Territory? The Israeli High Court of Justice Paradigm, 24 COLUM. 
J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 471 (1986). 
71 See generally Pressburg, supra note 1, at 39-42. 
72 See Reicin, supra note 3, at 516. 
73 See Comment, Israeli Settlements, supra note 4, at 581-9l. 
74 See Shehadeh, supra note 5, at 29. 
75 See generally, Punamaki, supra note 6. The International Red Cross reports that there 
were 500,000 detentions of Palestinians in the occupied areas in the first twenty years of the 
Israeli occupation, nearly one-third of the Palestinian population. Amnesty International 
reports the extensive torture of Palestinian prisoners by Israel. Id. at 82. 
76 The Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907,36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 205 Parry's T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
77 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 V.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva 
Convention]. 
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the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip comply 
with both of these conventions. 78 
There are several provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention 
which govern the military occupations to which the Convention 
applies. Article 2, paragraph 1, provides that the Convention is to 
apply to "all cases" of war or armed conflict "which may arise 
between two or more High Contracting Parties."79 The Convention, 
under Article 2, paragraph 2, also applies to "all cases of partial or 
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even 
if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance."8o Finally, 
Article 4 provides that "persons protected by the Convention are 
those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find 
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a 
Party to the conflict or an Occupying Power of which they are not 
nationals."81 
Israel argues that it is only obligated to comply with the Hague 
Convention and that it is not obligated to comply with the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.82 Israel justifies this position on two grounds. 
First, Israeli law automatically incorporates the rules of customary 
international law, but not those of conventional internationallaw.83 
Customary international law expresses maxims which bind all na-
tions, while conventional international law only binds those nations 
which were parties to the agreement expressing the law. 84 The 
provisions of the Hague Convention were declared by the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at N uremburg of 1945 to be indicative 
of customary international law.85 The rules of the Fourth Geneva 
78 See Reicin, supra note 3, at 518-19. 
79 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 2, ~ I. 
80 Id. art. 2, ~ 2. A High Contracting Party is one which ratified the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. 
8! Id. art. 4. 
82 Cohen, supra note 70, at 482-83. 
83 Id. at 484. 
84 Conventional law, or the law of treaties as it is also known, is that law created by 
agreement between two or more nations. It is much like the law or obligations created by 
contracts which binds only those nations who are parties to the convention or treaty. It is 
listed first by the International Court of Justice as sources of international law which it 
applies. This is because most treaties and conventions clearly show their legal terms and thus 
can be readily applied. M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-12 (1988). 
Customary international law has been defined as "certain maxims and customs conse-
crated by long use, and observed by nations in their mutual intercourse with each other as 
a kind of law." Id. at 35-36. It replaces the gaps that conventional law does not cover. It is 
fundamentally based upon the international custom and practice of nations which have 
evolved into international legal rules. Id. 
85 Cohen, supra note 70, at 484. 
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Convention, however, have never been declared as indicative of 
customary international law and thus are merely conventionallaw.86 
Israeli law only incorporates the rules of conventional international 
law if the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, formally enacts the rules 
into law. 87 This is true whether or not Israel is a contracting nation 
to the international convention in question. Even though Israel was 
a contracting party to the Convention, the Knesset has not yet 
enacted the rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention into Israeli law. 
This has led Israel to claim that these rules do not apply to its 
occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.88 
Israel further maintains that the Fourth Geneva Convention 
does not apply to its practices in the occupied areas because Israel 
is not an occupying power as defined in Article 2, paragraph 2, of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention.89 Article 2, paragraph 2, provides 
that "the Convention shall [also] apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the 
said occupation meets with no armed resistance."9o Jordan and 
Egypt, which administered the West Bank and Gaza Strip from 
1948 to 1967, are both contracting parties to this Convention, as is 
Israel. 91 Israel, however, claims that neither Jordan nor Egypt were 
the legitimate sovereigns over the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, 
respectively, and that to accept the applicability of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention to its occupation of these areas would implicitly 
recognize that Jordan and Egypt were the legitimate sovereigns over 
these areas from 1948 to 1967.92 Thus, argues Israel, it did not 
occupy the territory of a High Contracting Party. 
There is a basis for this view because the United Nations Par-
tition Resolution for Palestine did not provide for Jordanian or 
Egyptian sovereignty over these areas. 93 Therefore, the argument 
86 See id. 
87 Id. at 484. 
88 Id. at 485. 
89 See id. at 482-83. 
90 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 2, ~ 2. 
91 Note, Recent Israeli Security Measures Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, 3 CONN. J. 
INT'L L. 485, 485-86 n.3 (1988) [hereinafter, Note, Israeli Security). 
92 Cohen, supra note 70, at 483. 
93 G.A. Res. 181, supra note 44. This resolution did not provide for Jordan or Egypt to 
administer, annex or occupy any portion of the Palestinian state. The Palestinian state was 
to be independent. Jordan and Egypt moved into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively, 
after the 1948 War in order to protect the Palestinians from further Israeli expansion. H. 
NUSEIBEH, supra note 43, at 26. The two countries then remained in these areas until Israel 
conquered the areas in the 1967 War. See C. SMITH, supra note 27, at 147. 
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continues, because Jordan and Egypt did not legitimately exercise 
sovereignty over these areas, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were 
not the territories of a High Contracting Party. 
This view, however, fails to consider the interests or rights of 
the Palestinian people who inhabit these areas. The West Bank and 
Gaza Strip were part of the area allocated to the proposed Palestin-
ian state in 1947 under the U.N. Partition Resolution for Palestine.94 
Once the 1948 Arab-Israeli War ended, Jordan and Egypt moved 
in and administered the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively, in 
order to protect the Palestinian refugees displaced by the war.95 
Jordan and Egypt thus arguably were the legitimate sovereigns over 
these areas from 1948 to 1967, and the Fourth Geneva Convention 
does apply to the Israeli occupation of these areas under Article 2, 
paragraph 2.96 
An examination of Article 2, paragraph 1 supports the appli-
cation of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under Article 2, paragraph 1, 
the Convention is to apply generally to "all cases" of war or armed 
conflict "which may arise between two or more High Contracting 
Parties .... "97 It does not specifically require that any territory 
conquered or occupied by the victorious High Contracting Party be 
a legitimate territory of any other High Contracting Party or Par-
ties. 98 The Israeli occupation began during the 1967 War between 
Israel and several Arab states, including Jordan and Egypt.99 The 
Fourth Geneva Convention thus applies to the Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip whether or not Jordan or Egypt were 
the legitimate sovereigns over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The intent of the framers of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
buttresses such a conclusion. The drafters and signatories of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention intended "humanitarian considera-
tions" to be the underlying purpose of the Convention. lOo The 
Convention applies to any case of armed conflict or military occu-
pation, regardless of territorial considerations. lUI Article 1 provides 
94 G.A. Res. 181, supra note 44. 
95 C. SMITH, supra note 27, at 147-48. 
'l6 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 70, art. 2, ~ 2. 
97 [d. art. 2, ~ I. 
98Id. 
99 Cohen, supra note 77, at 471. 
100 Report of the Secretary·General of the United Nations to the Security Council re-
garding the Situation in the Occupied Territories, 43 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. No. S1I9443, 
reprinted in 17 J. PALESTINE STUD. 66, 73 (Spring 1988) [hereinafter U.N. Report]. 
101 [d. 
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that "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to 
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances."102 
The phrase "in all circumstances" was intended to include all in-
stances of armed conflict or military occupation even when the 
people in the occupied area were not citizens of a High Contracting 
Party. 103 
Furthermore, Article 4 provides that "persons protected by the 
Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner 
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in 
the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which 
they are not nationals."104 The Palestinians are living under Israeli 
military occupation and they are not nationals of Israel. Articles 2 
and 4 thus are triggered, supporting the application of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. 
Finally, the international community, through the United Na-
tions, has recognized that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies 
to all cases of military occupation whether or not the High Con-
tracting Party formerly exercising control of the area presently 
occupied was a legitimate sovereign over that area. \05 Moreover, the 
United Nations Security Council has specifically decided that the 
Convention applies to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. \06 
Therefore, the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
clearly apply to Israeli administrative and security practices in the 
occupied areas. Israel, while proclaiming that the Convention does 
not apply to its occupation of these areas, nonetheless has asserted 
that it would comply with the Convention in its practices in the 
occupied areas. l07 It has further maintained that its policies do 
comply with both the Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. lOS An analysis of these policies follows. 
102 Fourth Geneva Convention. supra note 77, art. I (emphasis added). 
J(J:l U.N. Report, supra note 100, at 72-73. 
104 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 4. 
105 U.N. Report, supra note 100, at 73. 
106 S.C. Res. 605, 42 U.N. SCOR - Resolutions and Decisions at 4 (1987). Though 
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions are not formal sources 
of international law many resolutions have represented international "law-in-the-making" 
and the propositions stated by many resolutions are now accepted principles of international 
law. E. MCWHINNEY, UNITED NATIONS LAW MAKING, 55-57 (1984). 
IU7 Israeli & Ehrenfeld, Between the Peak and the Pit: Human Rights in Israel, 13 SYRACUSE 
J. INT'L L. & COM. 403, 424 (1987). 
108 See Reicin, supra note 3, at 518-20. 
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B. The Rule of Law in the Occupied Territories 
An issue facing many occupying powers is what law they should 
apply to occupied areas. Article 43 of the Hague Convention pro-
vides for occupying powers to respect local law except when abso-
lutely prevented from doing SO.I09 Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention allows legislation by an occupying power to ensure the 
security of the occupying power and its forces, to maintain orderly 
government of the occupied areas, and to enable the occupying 
power to comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention. I 10 Occupying 
powers thus possess some discretion in enacting security and crim-
inallaw. 
Israel officially recognizes the local law of the occupied terri-
tories as the governing law in these areas, except when such laws 
conflict with the proclamations and orders of the Military Com-
mander. 111 This "local law" includes old Ottoman law, Jordanian 
and Egyptian law, 112 as well as the Defense (Emergency) Regulations 
of 1945.113 Many of the Israeli security practices in the occupied 
areas are based on provisions in these Regulations. I 14 These Regu-
lations were enacted by Great Britain, while it was still entrusted 
with the Mandate for Palestine, in order to combat Jewish and 
Palestinian terrorism. liS These Regulations apply in conjunction 
with the proclamations of the Israeli Military Commander over all 
criminal and security matters. 116 However, their viability as enforce-
able law is questionable. This is because Jordan did not recognize 
them as applicable law during their nineteen year administration of 
the West Bank. 117 
Israel justifies its use of the Regulations by pointing to Procla-
mation No.2 of the Jordanian government during its administra-
10" Hague Convention, supra note 76. art. 43. Article 43 states: "The authority of the 
legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take 
all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." 
IIU Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 64. The first sentence of Article 64 
states: "The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception 
that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they 
constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention." 
III Israeli & Ehrenfeld, supra note 107, at 424. 
112 Reicin, supra note 3, at 530. 
II" Cohen, supra note 70, at 490. 
114 Reicin, .Iupra note 3, at 534. 
liS Talhami, supra note 20, at 480. 
IIG Cohen, supra note 70, at 489,490. 
II, Talhami, supra note 20, at 480-8L 
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tion of the West Bank. lls Proclamation No.2 recognized all laws in 
force in Palestine after the British Mandate ended as the law of the 
West Bank. ll9 Palestinians have argued, however, that because Jor-
dan never expressly recognized the Regulations as applicable law 
nor enforced the Regulations, Jordan had impliedly rescinded the 
Regulations. 120 Assuming that Jordan did recognize the applicability 
of all previous laws in the West Bank, there is nonetheless evidence 
that the British themselves may have repealed these Regulations 
prior to the Jordanian administration of the West Bank. On May 
12, 1948 Britain revoked the Palestine Order in Council of 1937 
under which the Regulations were enacted. This essentially can-
celled the Regulations. 121 Israel, however, maintains that this revo-
cation was not effective and the Regulations are indeed still valid 
because Britain did not provide notice of this revocation within 
Palestine itself. Consequently, the argument continues, attorneys 
within Palestine had no notice that the local law had changed. 122 
Israel's recognition of the Regulations may nonetheless comply 
with the Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
The recognition and enforcement of the Regulations arguably is 
necessary to ensure the security of Israel and its military forces in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to maintain safe and orderly 
government in these areas. The Hague Convention does not pro-
hibit the enactment or recognition of such law and the Fourth 
Geneva Convention expressly allows for it. 123 
C. Palestinian Right of Access to the Israeli High Court of justice 
There is no basis for allowing the inhabitants of an occupied 
area access to the highest appeals court of the occupying power in 
Israeli law or the Hague Convention. 124 Article 66 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, however, states that " ... the Occupying Power 
may hand over the [criminally] accused to its properly constituted, 
non-political military courts, on condition that the said courts sit in 
the occupied country. Courts of appeal shall preferably sit in the 
lIS Reicin, supra note 3, at 535, 536. 
II9Id. at 535. 
12°Id. at 535-36. 
121 Talhami, supra note 20, at 481. 
122Id. 
123 Hague Convention, supra note 76, art. 43; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, 
art. 64. 
124 Cohen, supra note 70, at 474. 
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occupied country."125 Article 71 provides that the occupying power 
must allow accused persons the right to a trial for their alleged 
offenses. 126 Article 72 guarantees the accused the right to present 
evidence in his favor. 127 Finally, Article 73 guarantees the accused 
the right to appeal any sentence imposed upon him.128 
Israel affords Palestinians inhabiting the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip the right to a trial for criminal charges brought in Israeli 
military courts. 129 Furthermore, though no other contemporary oc-
cupying power allows inhabitants of occupied areas access to its 
highest court, the Israeli High Court of Justice can review the results 
of these trials and can review all legislative and security actions by 
the Military Commander for the occupied areas. 130 This right of 
Palestinian access to the courts provides the opportunity for judicial 
review of any military actions or security measures undertaken in 
the West Bank or Gaza Strip and theoretically puts the Palestinians 
on the same level as Israeli citizens in the administration of justice. l3l 
Although the High Court of Justice sits in Israel proper this fact 
does not violate Article 66's provision that appeals courts "prefer-
ably" sit in the occupied area. 
The High Court asserts that there is no legal basis for its 
jurisdiction over the Palestinians other than agreement to such 
jurisdiction by the state itself. 132 The Court's jurisdiction is only on 
personal grounds, not on territorial grounds, so any Palestinian 
petition to the Court does not acknowledge an Israeli right to sov-
ereignty over the West Bank or Gaza Strip.133 This access not only 
allows Palestinians to obtain judicial review of the acts of the Israeli 
Military Commander, it also acts as a nominal guarantee that the 
Military Commander's actions will comply with international law 
and Israeli law, and he will thus exercise some self-restraint before 
acting. 134 Palestinians, however, view this right of appeal to an Israeli 
court as a step toward Israeli annexation of the occupied areas. 135 
12' Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 66. 
126 Id. art. 71. 
127 Id. art. 72. 
128 Id. art. 73. 
129 Israeli & Ehrenfeld, supra note 107, at 427-28. 
130 Reicin, supra note 3, at 532. 
131 Israeli & Ehrenfeld, supra note 107, at 426. 
132 Reicin, supra note 3, at 533 (citing Sheikh Suleiman Abu Hilu v. Israel, H.C. 302172, 
27(2) P.D. 169 (1975); Al Jamah v. Minister of Defense, H.C. 337171, 26(1) P.D. 574 (1972)). 
133 Cohen, supra note 70, at 475. 
134 Israeli & Ehrenfeld, supra note 107, at 426-27. 
m Talhami, supra note 20, at 484-85. 
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Many Palestinians therefore do not exercise this right of access to 
Israeli courts.!36 
D. Preventive Detentions 
In 1967 Israel authorized the use of preventive detentions in 
Security Instructions Order, Article 87.137 This Order allowed the 
Military Commander for the occupied areas, as well as district mil-
itary commanders appointed by the Military Commander, to issue 
preventive detentions when "necessary and expedient" to ensure 
public order and safety.!38 This Order essentially amended Regu-
lations 108 and III of the Defense Regulations!39 to comply with 
the Fourth Geneva Convention by allowing detainees a right to 
appeal all detentions.!40 
Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention allows for preven-
tive detentions of persons in occupied areas for "imperative reasons 
of security," as long as detainees have a right to judicial review.!4! 
Article 78, as well as Article 41, also provides that an occupying 
power "may at the most, subject [detainees] to assigned residence 
or to internment."!42 This indicates that preventive detentions are 
permissible under the Fourth Geneva Convention but that they are 
the strongest security measures an occupying power can employ. 
An occupying power thus must demonstrate that any other security 
measure it uses is less severe than preventive detention. "Necessary 
and expedient" reasons to ensure public order are substantially 
similar to "imperative reasons of security." The 1967 Order thus 
complies with Article 78. 
Israel, however, modified this order in 1979 to provide that 1) 
district commanders can issue detention orders for a period of no 
more than four days; 2) the Military Commander can issue orders 
of up to six months which must be reviewed by a military court 
136 Israeli & Ehrenfeld, supra note 107, at 426. 
137 Reicin, supra note 3, at 537 (citing Security Instructions Order (Judea and Samaria) 
No. S15, art. S7 (1967) (amend. IS) (5740119S0), 46 K.M. Judea and Samaria 24S). 
1381d. at 53S. 
1391d. at 537 (citing Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), 
Reg. lOS, at lOS2 and Reg. III, at lOS3 (Supp. II Sept. 27,1945». 
140 !d. 
141 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 7S. 
142 ld. arts. 41, 7S. Article 41, ~ I states: "Should the Power in whose hands protected 
persons may be consider the measures of control mentioned in the present Convention to 
be inadequate, it may not have recourse to any other measure of control more severe than 
that of assigned residence or internment .... " 
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within four days; and 3) that preventive detentions need no longer 
be based upon "necessary and expedient" reasons for public order 
but only upon "reasonable grounds" showing that the detainee may 
be a security risk. 143 This modification loosened the controls on 
military authorities ordering detentions. 144 The "reasonable 
grounds" standard expressed in this modification clearly imposes 
less controls on officials ordering detentions than issuing such or-
ders for "imperative reasons of security." It thus does not comply 
with Article 78. 
Since the current uprising began, the Israeli army has issued 
new orders which allow the military to detain Palestinians without 
any specific charges or evidence and which have eliminated judicial 
review of detention orders.145 Officials issuing detention orders no 
longer even have to show "reasonable grounds" that the detainee is 
a security risk. These orders clearly violate Article 78. 
The Fourth Geneva Convention also provides for the proper 
treatment of detainees. Article 76 guarantees detainees the right to 
be imprisoned in the occupied area and the right to proper observ-
ance of prisoners' rights by the occupying power. 146 These include 
provisions for the housing of detainees in "quarters which afford 
every possible safeguard as regards hygiene and health, and provide 
sufficient protection against the rigours of the climate ... ,"147 and 
for adequate medical treatment and facilities for all detainees. 148 A 
University of Helsinki study,149 an Amnesty International study,150 
and an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report l51 
of Israeli treatment of Palestinian detainees show that Israel contin-
ually violates these provisions. Amnesty International reports that 
the Israeli military extracts "confessions" from detained Palestinians 
through severe interrogation and that torture is a regular feature 
of the internment of Palestinians. 152 The Helsinki study provides 
143 Reicin, supra note 3, at 539. 
144 N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1988, at AI, col. 3. 
145Id. 
146 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 76. 
\47 Id. art. 85. 
14Rld. arts. 91,92. 
149 Punamaki, supra note 6. 
150/d. at 82 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES (1984) [herein-
after TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES]). 
151Id. 
152 TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES 134. Amnesty International reports that Palestinian detai-
nees are "hooded, handcuffed, and forced to stand without moving for many hours at a time 
for several days, and have been exposed while naked to cold showers or cold air ventilators 
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specific detailed accounts by former Palestinian prisoners who re-
counted their experiences of severe torture while detained in Israeli 
prisons. 153 
E. Curfews 
Since the beginning of the current uprIsmg, Israel has used 
curfews to block Palestinian protests and demonstrations against the 
occupation. 154 Curfews are necessary, Israeli army officials maintain, 
because the army is unable to control the occupied areas during 
these protests. 155 These curfews sometimes restrict the movement 
of up to one-third of the total Palestinian population at a time 156 
and can last for days.157 The Security Instructions Order, Article 
89, authorizes the use of curfews in the occupied areas. ISS Article 
89 was derived from Regulation 124 of the 1945 Defense 
Regulations 159 and allows the Military Commander to order curfews 
without specifying any reason. 160 
Curfews present a problem under international law because 
there is no express provision for the use of them in either the 
Hague Convention or the Fourth Geneva Convention, and because 
the ends of curfews are subject to conflicting interpretations. One 
for long periods of time. Detainees have also been deprived of food, sleep and toilet and 
medical facilities, and have been subjected to abuse, insults, and threats against themselves 
and the female members of their families." [d. 
153 Punamaki, supra note 6, at 88-89. Former Palestinian detainees have given the 
following accounts: 
One of the (Israeli) interrogators was keen on beating my testicles time and 
again, as a result of which I fainted more than eight times. 
Once, more than five interrogators showed me to a small room, my hands were 
tied and my eyes blindfolded. They rushed in and suddenly began beating me 
without asking any questions for five hours running. I was severely beaten with 
sticks and a hammer on the sensitive spots of my body till I lost consciousness. 
A terrible experience was the altempt by the soldiers to rape the sister and wife 
of a fellow prisoner before his eyes. 
I was left in solitary confinement for eighteen days; (the Israeli guards) sprayed 
cold water on me, but I was not allowed to bathe or clean myself. 
I was hung naked from the ceiling, tied up by the hands or legs, or simulta-
neously by hands and legs, time and again. 
IH N.V. Times, Jan. 13, 1988, at A3, col. I; N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988 at A12, col. I. 
155 N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, at A3, col. I. 
15b N.V. Times, Apr. 19, at A12, col. I. 
157 N.V. Times, Jan. 13, at A3, col. I. 
15R Reicin, supra note 3, at 543 (citing Security Instructions Order (Judea and Samaria), 
No. 815, an. 89 (amend. 18) (574011980), 46 K.M. Judea and Samaria 249). 
159 [d. (citing Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), Reg. 
124, at 1090 (Supp. II Sept. 27,1945)). 
160 [d. 
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view sees curfews as a collective punishment against a large group 
of persons for the action of one or a few members of that group.161 
Article 50 of the Hague Convention 162 and Article 33 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 163 both prohibit such collective punishments. 
The use of curfews thus is a violation of both conventions under 
this interpretation. 
Another interpretation is that curfews are merely orders of 
assigned residence which maintain public order and security and 
prevent future violence. 164 The Fourth Geneva Convention does 
not prohibit the use of curfews under this interpretation. Article 78 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention allows for preventive detentions 
in the form of assigned residences for "imperative security rea-
sons."165 Both of these interpretations, however, could apply to 
almost any situation which potentially calls for the imposition of a 
curfew. The lawfulness of curfews under the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention thus depends upon which way one views the purposes of 
curfews. 
The Israeli military has acknowledged that it uses curfews as a 
"collective punishment,"166 and this in fact occurs as curfews some-
times affect hundreds of thousands of persons. 167 This admission 
suggests that Israel itself views curfews as collective punishments. 
Curfews, as Israel uses them, thus violate the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention. 
Israel does allow any person subjected to a curfew the right to 
appeal the imposition of the curfew to the Israeli High Court of 
Justice. 168 This right of appeal, however, may offer little protection 
from arbitrary or exceedingly severe curfews because the Military 
Commander can cancel a curfew anytime before the High Court 
reviews the order imposing the curfew. This renders judicial review 
of the order moot even though the population is still forced to 
endure the curfew for at least a limited period of time. 
161 Id. at 544. 
162 Hague Convention, supra note 76, art. 50. Article 50 states: "No general penalty, 
pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of 
individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible." 
163 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 33. Article 33 states: "No protected 
person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective 
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited." 
164 Reicin, supra note 3, at 544. 
165 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra t:ote 77, art. 78. 
166 N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1988, at A3, col. 1. 
167 N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at A12, col. I. 
168 See Reicin, supra note 3, at 545. 
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F. Demolition of Homes 
Israel cites Defense Regulation 119( 1) to justify the demolition 
of Palestinian homes when a resident of that home has allegedly 
committed a serious act of "terrorism" or some other significant 
security infraction. 169 The Israeli High Court of Justice has repeat-
edly upheld demolitions because of their deterrent effect. l7O It has 
ignored the principles of international law regarding the destruc-
tion of property and instead focused upon whether the military 
authorities abused their discretion in ordering the demolitions. l7l 
Article 46 of the Hague Convention provides that all persons' 
private property must be respected and cannot be confiscated,172 
and Article 47 forbids the pillage of property.173 Article 53 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention specifically prohibits any destruction of 
real or personal property except where "such destruction is ren-
dered absolutely necessary by military operations."174 International 
law thus prohibits the destruction of private homes by occupying 
armies absent extreme necessity. 
Israel claims that the demolition of homes as practiced in the 
occupied areas complies with Article 53 because there is an "imper-
ative military necessity" to punish and deter suspected Palestinian 
terrorists. 175 Israel, however, in destroying the homes of alleged 
terrorists, punishes everyone who resides in the home. As noted 
above, Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention forbids such 
"collective penalties" against all the residents of a home. 176 More-
It;9 [d. at 546 (citing Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), 
Reg. 119(2), at 1089 (Supp. II Sept. 27, 1945)). 
1'0 See id. at 548-53 (citing Sakhwil v. Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, H.C. 
434179,34(1) P.D. 464 (1980); Khamed v. Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, H.C. 
22/81,35(3) P.D. 223 (1981); Hamamra v. Minister of Defense, H.C. 274/82, 36(2) P.D. 755 
(1982); Hamri v. Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, H.C. 361182, 36(3) P.D. 439 
(1982); Motzlah v. Minister of Defense, H.C. 572/82, 36(4) P.D. 610 (1982); Abu Allan v. 
Minister of Defense, H.C. 126/83,37(2) P.D. 169 (1983)). 
1'1 [d. at 549-50. 
172 Hague Convention, supra note 76, art. 46. Article 46 states: "Family honour and 
rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, 
must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated." 
173 [d. art. 47. Article 47 states: "Pillage is formally forbidden." 
174 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 53. 
1'5 Reicin, supra note 3, at 546. This "imperative military necessity" may sometimes result 
in unnecessary, objectionable and illegal demolitions such as when the homes of fourteen 
Palestinian families were destroyed because of the alleged stoning of an Israeli teenage girl 
by members of those families. Investigations by the Israeli army revealed that an Israeli 
guard had mistakenly shot and killed the girl. The demolitions nonetheless proceeded. N.V. 
Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at A I, col. 3. 
176 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 33. 
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over, one could interpret Article 53's allowance of property destruc-
tion when absolutely necessary as a reference only to those times 
when the occupying power is involved in actual military engage-
ments and it cannot avoid destroying property in order to defend 
itself or the occupied area's inhabitants. This interpretation would 
not allow the demolition of homes as punishment against the in-
habitants of the occupied area. 
It is again important to note that Articles 78 and 41 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention prohibit any punishments more severe 
than preventive detentions. 177 Some would argue that the demoli-
tion of homes is more severe than the preventive detention of an 
alleged "terrorist" because it destroys all of the possessions of the 
home's inhabitants. They are left with nothing, even though some 
of them may be guilty of nothing. Furthermore, a preventive de-
tention only directly punishes one person and the detainee at least 
retains the hope of release and return to his home. 
G. Deportations 
Regulation 112( 1) of the Defense Regulations of 1945 author-
izes the use of deportations for "security reasons."178 For the Israeli 
military, an allegation of being a supporter of the PLO or of Islamic 
fundamentalists is enough of a "security reason" to justify depor-
tation. 179 A deported person must remain outside of Israel and the 
occupied areas for as long as the order is in force. ISO A deportee, 
however, may appeal an order of deportation to a military advisory 
committee and then to the Israeli High Court of J ustice. 181 
International law restricts the deportation of persons living in 
an occupied area. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
prohibits the deportation of individual persons or large numbers 
of persons from an occupied area to any other country except for 
evacuations or safety reasons. 182 Article 147 declares that "unlawful 
177 Id. arts. 41, 78. For the text of Article 41, see supra note 142. 
178 Reicin, supra note 3, at 553 (citing Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Palestine 
Gazette (No. 1442), Reg. 112, at 1085 (Supp. II Sept. 27,1945)). 
179 N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1988, at AI, co!. 2. 
180 Note, Israeli Security, supra note 91, at 492. 
181Id. 
182 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 49. Article 49, 11 1 states: "Individual 
or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory 
to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are 
prohibited, regardless of their motive." 
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deportation[s] or transfer[s]" of persons in occupied areas are 
"grave breaches" of the Convention. 183 
Israel maintains that both of these articles allow for the depor-
tations authorized in Regulation 112( 1). Israel cites the Official 
Commentary to Article 49 which refers to the mass deportations 
and transfers of populations which occurred during World War 
11. 184 It argues that Article 49 was drafted to prohibit only these 
mass deportations and that the deportations from the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip are not this type of deportation. 185 Israel also argues 
that its deportations are not prohibited by Article 49 because Israel 
is not deporting Palestinians from occupied areas to "the territory 
of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country."186 It asserts 
that the deportation of Palestinians to Jordan is merely a deporta-
tion to their own country because Palestinians hold Jordanian pass-
ports. 187 
Israel further argues that Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention does not prohibit deportations because this provision 
identifies unlawful deportations as a grave breach. 188 It argues that 
because the article mentions unlawful deportations there must be 
lawful deportations. 189 In addition, because the Article provides that 
deportations are only a "grave breach," it maintains that Article 147 
does not absolutely prohibit deportations. 190 
This logic is flawed. Article 49 expressly prohibits all deporta-
tions. 191 Moreover, the Official Commentary to Article 147 explains 
that the horror of World War II "made it necessary to prohibit 
deportation[s] completely."192 Thus, there are no lawful deporta-
tions. Deportations are a grave breach of international law and are 
clearly prohibited. 
Israel's claim that it is only transferring Palestinians to their 
actual home nation, Jordan, is also unfounded. The Palestinians 
IS3Id. art. 147. 
184 r.C.R.C. COMMENTARY ON THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION 278 (J. Pictet ed. 1958), 
[hereinafter OFFICIAL COMMENTARY]. 
IS5 Note, Israeli Security, supra note 91, at 492-93. 
186 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 49. 
187 Note, UN. Security Council Resolutions Regarding Deportations From Israeli Administered 
Territories: The Applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, 24 STAN. J. OF INT'L L. 611, 630 (1988). 
188 Reicin, supra note 3, at 556. 
189Id. 
190 Note, Israeli Security, supra note 91, at 493. 
191 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 49. For text of Article 49, paragraph 
1, see supra note 182. 
192 OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 184, at 599. 
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are a people who have lived in the area of Palestine, including the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, for about two thousand years. 193 These 
areas, not Jordan or any other area, comprise their home. More-
over, Jordan has declared that it will not accept Palestinians de-
ported by Israel. I94 Finally, Israel does not only deport Palestinians 
to Jordan. It also deports them to Lebanon and other neighboring 
nations. 195 
Furthermore, deportations are a more severe punishment than 
preventive detentions, the most severe punishment an occupying 
power can employ under the Fourth Geneva Convention. 196 This is 
because deportees are driven from their homes, their families and 
their country.197 Preventive detentions at least allow the detainee to 
remain in his homeland and the detainee is usually able to see his 
family periodically.198 
Finally, though Israel allows deportees a right to appeal the 
order of deportation, up to the High Court of Justice if necessary, 199 
this right is highly illusory. Deportees can be forced to appeal their 
deportation from abroad.20o This provides precedent which allows 
for the deportation of Palestinians before they can appeal, thus 
forcing them to appeal from outside the occupied areas. Moreover, 
the fact that the Israeli High Court of Justice has never overturned 
a deportation order201 shows the substantial procedural obstacles 
that a deported Palestinian faces in trying to appeal his deportation. 
Israeli lawyers who represent deportees maintain that depor-
tation procedures, including the appeal process, are merely a "cha-
rade."202 The Israeli authorities can withhold any specific charges 
and evidence against a deportee from the deportee and his lawyer, 
making it impossible to contest or appeal a deportation.203 In fact, 
several Israeli defense attorneys have attacked the inequitable treat-
ment that Palestinians receive in deportation procedures. Felicia 
Langer, a prominent Israeli defense attorney, has observed that 
193 See generally F. KHOURI, supra note 19, at 2. 
194 Note, Israeli Security, supra note 91, at 494. 
195 See Talhami, supra note 20, at 482. 
196 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, arts. 41, 78. For the text of Article 41, see 
supra note 142. 
197 Talhami, supra note 20, at 482. 
198 Note, Israeli Security, supra note 91, at 495. 
199 Reicin, supra note 3, at 554. 
200Id. 
201 N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, at A3, col. 3. 
202 N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1988, at AI0, col. 1. 
203Id. 
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"[a]ppearance in front of a judge in a West Bank military court is 
like a battle with ghosts."204 Another Israeli defense attorney has 
also maintained that deportation is a punishment that does not fit 
the crimes of which most Palestinians are accused.205 
H. Israeli Settlement of the Occupied Territories 
Israel began its settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip under the "Allon Plan" of 1967 for "security purposes."206 
This policy expanded in the late 1970s and 1980s in an Israeli effort 
to allow its citizens to settle in all areas of "Greater Israel" and thus 
create a situation which would preclude both any Palestinian action 
against the state of Israel and any creation of a Palestinian state.207 
One commentator has concluded that this settlement policy has 
become irreversible,208 though other commentators have disagreed 
on both political and practical grounds.209 
Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an oc-
cupying power from annexing an occupied area,210 and Article 49 
prohibits any "transfer of parts of its own civilian population into 
the territory it occupies."211 Yet, Israel has allowed tens of thousands 
of its people to take up permanent residence in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.212 It has also extended Israeli law to those Israelis who 
live in these territories. 213 This policy not only violates Article 49 
but amounts to a de facto annexation and thus also violates Article 
47. The United Nations has condemned the settlements on this 
204 Talhami, supra note 20, at 483. 
205 See id. at 484-85. 
206Id. at 485. 
207 Comment, Israeli Settlements, supra note 4, at 582-83. 
208 Id. at 584. Meron Benvenisti, Mayor of Jerusalem, has argued that the Israeli gov-
ernment now has control of over fifty percent of the land on the West Bank and a sizable 
portion of the land in the Gaza Strip as well. He also predicts that the number of Jewish 
settlers will reach 100,000 by 1990. These are facts which Benvenisti argues dictate that the 
occupied areas will remain under direct Israeli control for the foreseeable future. Id. at 584-
85. 
209Id. at 585 n. 247. Abba Eban, former Foreign Minister of Israel, has stated that all 
attempts to overcome the Palestinian character of the occupied areas through Israeli settle-
ment have not succeeded and that Palestinian rule of the occupied areas is inevitable. Id. 
Yadin Kaufmann, an Israeli Supreme Court law clerk, maintains that the support for settle-
ment and annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is not as strong as many believe. Id. 
at 585. 
210 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 47. 
211 Id. at art. 49. 
212 Comment, Israeli Settlements, supra note 4, at 584-85. 
213 Talhami, supra note 20, at 486. 
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basis. Security Council Resolution 237 demanded Israeli assurances 
for the safety, welfare, and security of all the inhabitants of Palestine 
and respect for the rights of these inhabitants.214 Security Council 
Resolution 242 called for Israel to withdraw completely from the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.215 Security Council Resolution 252 de-
nounced all Israeli expropriations of Palestinian land in Jerusalem 
and the occupied areas.216 General Assembly Resolution 2851 spe-
cifically called for Israel to desist from its settlement policies. 217 
Finally, even the United States, Israel's greatest ally, has repeatedly 
denounced the settlement policy as illegal under international 
law.218 
Israel has ignored all of these protests and continues to expand 
its settlements.219 The settlements have created a dual legal system 
in the occupied areas which resembles the universally condemned 
apartheid system of South Africa.220 The Israeli settlers are subject 
to Israeli law while the Palestinians are subject to a different system 
of law, the Defense Regulations of 1945 and the proclamations of 
the Israeli military commander.221 Israel has also attempted to sep-
arate the Israeli settlers from the Palestinian population by con-
structing a system of roads in the West Bank and Gaza Strip which 
connect Israeli settlements with each other and with Israel so that 
settlers need not pass through Palestinian-inhabited areas.222 Israeli 
settlers thus receive all the benefits of living in Israel while the 
Palestinians are denied any right to sovereignty over their own land, 
just as white South Africans receive all the benefits of South African 
law while blacks receive no such benefits. The West Bank and Gaza 
Strip are "virtually annexed to Israel but without the Arabs living 
in those areas. "223 
I. "Force, Might and Beatings"224 
The current Palestinian uprising has also resulted in the latest 
Israeli security practice of "force, might and beatings," the new plan 
214 S.C. Res. 237, 22 U.N. SCOR - Resolutions and Decisions at 5 (1967). 
215 S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR - Resolutions and Decisions at 8 (1967). 
216 S.C. Res. 252, 23 U.N. SCOR - Resolutions and Decisions at 9 (1968). 
217 G.A. Res. 2851, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 48, U.N. Doc. Al8429 (1971). 
218 Talhami, supra note 20, at 486. 
219 Boston Globe, Jan. 31, 1989, at 3, col. 2. 
220 Talhami, supra note 20, at 486. 
221Id. 
222 Pressburg, supra note 1, at 39. 
223 Talhami, supra note 20, at 486. 
224 Shehadeh, supra note 5, at 29. 
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of Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin. 225 It is designed to stop 
Palestinian youths from throwing stones at Israeli troopS.226 This 
policy involves the use of actual force by the Israelis to instill fear 
into the Palestinians through the use of beatings,227 rubber and 
plastic bullets,228 and an intensification of the already mentioned 
standard Israeli security practices.229 Beatings are the primary de-
vice. Israeli soldiers intentionally break the arm and leg bones and 
lacerate the muscle tissue of Palestinian youths. 230 This prevents the 
youths from throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers. "Force, might and 
beatings," however, has provoked an angry denunciation from the 
international community and from many of Israel's own citizens.231 
This policy clearly violates both the Hague Convention and the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. 232 Article 46 of the Hague Convention 
provides that an occupying power must respect the lives, honor and 
rights of persons in the occupied areas.233 Though Article 27 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention provides that the occupying power can 
take those measures to maintain control and security "as may be 
necessary as a result of [a] war" it reiterates the provisions of Article 
46 of the Hague Convention and adds that all persons are to be 
"humanely treated, and shall be protected ... against insults and 
public curiosity."234 Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
also specifically forbids " ... any measures of such a character as 
to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected per-
sons in [the occupying power's] hands."235 This Article applies to 
any " . . . measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or 
military agents."236 These provisions show that "force, might and 
beatings" is an unlawful measure for an occupying power to take 
against the inhabitants of an occupied area. A power must always 
225 N.Y. Times, jan. 24,1988, at AI, col. 2, A10, col. 1. 
226 Shehadeh, supra note 5, at 29. 
227 N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, at L16, col. 4. 
228 N.Y. Times, jan. 17, 1988, at A3, col. 1. 
229 See Shehadeh, supra note 5, at 30. 
230 N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, at L16, col. 4-5. 
231 See generally Ber-On, Israeli Reactions to the Palestinian Uprising, 17 J. PALESTINE STUD., 
46, 56-58, (Summer 1988). The Israeli peace movement, led by the group Peace Now, has 
lobbied for an end to the current practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for more 
humane treatment for the Palestinians, and for a recognition that the solution to the Pales-
tinian crisis must include an acceptance of jewish and Palestinian self-determination. 
232 See Shehadeh, supra note 5, at 29-31. 
233 Hague Convention, supra note 76, art. 46. 
234 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 77, art. 27. 
235Id. art. 32. 
236 Id. 
1990] ISRAELI SECURITY PRACTICES 119 
respect the inalienable rights of the area's inhabitants until it is able 
to end the occupation and release the occupied area to its proper 
sovereIgn. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current uprising against the twenty-year old Israeli military 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is unlikely to end until 
Israel withdraws from these areas and allows for Palestinian self-
determination. It is unreasonable, however, to expect this result to 
occur in the near future. Israel has been firm in its proclamations 
that it will not give up any of the occupied areas,237 and the Pales-
tinians are not yet capable of presenting a very great threat to the 
Israeli military. The international community can and should none-
theless continue to apply pressure on Israel to abide by the provi-
sions of the Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention 
so long as it occupies the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is clear that 
many of Israel's current "security practices" in these areas violate 
both of these conventions and thus, a change in these practices is 
necessary. 
Richard Ober 
237 Boston Globe, Jan. 4, 1989, at 3, col. I. 
